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CIES DISCUSSION PAPER 0510 
Grants, Contracts, and the Division of Labor in Academic Research
1 
Eran Binenbaum, School of Economics, University of Adelaide 
 
I Introduction 
This paper aims to shed light on the division of labor among types of research 
sponsors and among universities.  It interprets data on grants and contracts as conveying 
information on the sponsors’ objectives and on the nature of the sponsored institutions.  
Building on this idea, the paper investigates some notions that appear to be fairly 
common: That more prestigious universities tend to rely more on grant funding relative to 
contract funding; that less prestigious research universities tend to rely more heavily on 
contracts; that grant (contract) funding tends to be associated with basic (applied) 
research; and that types of sponsors differ in their use of grants versus contracts, 
depending on their institutional commitment to knowledge as a public good.   
  These issues clearly have policy relevance.  University administrators and other 
research policy makers should understand the division of labor among research 
institutions and the division of preferences among research sponsors.  Theoretical and 
                                                           
1 I am indebted to David Zilberman who, in his capacity as my orals chair, provided the basic idea that got 
this paper, based on Binenbaum (2002), started.  My other oral committee members, Ethan Ligon, Dave 
Mowery, and Dick Norgaard, as well as my advisor, Brian Wright, also gave good comments. This paper 
would not have been possible without two separate data sets for which I depended on Joyce Friedman and 
Neil Maxwell of the Sponsored Projects Office at UC Berkeley, and on Allen Moore and Dennis 
Unglesbee, CRIS staff members at the USDA.  My understanding of these data was also helped by 
conversations with Cherisa Yarkin of the Office of the President of UC and Kelly Day-Rubinstein of 






empirical analysis leading to information and insights about potential competitors, 
collaborators, and funders, may provide a firmer basis for strategic decisions. 
Similarly, the present study should be of interest to scholars of innovation 
systems.  The division of labor among research institutions and the division of 
preferences among research sponsors are crucial aspects of innovation systems.   
Furthermore, the distinction between basic and applied research is both problematic and 
important.  The present study proposes (1) to conceive of “basicness” and “appliedness”
2 
in bivariate and continuous terms, and (2) to use data on the relative use of contracts and 
grants for research funding to draw inferences on basicness versus appliedness.  These 
ideas may be useful for future studies of innovation systems, because many data sets – in 
contrast to the Berkeley data set used here – fail to supply direct information on the basic 
or applied nature of research.  Among existing literature reviewed by me, Goldfarb 
(2001) comes closest to the theme of the present paper.  He postulates that “the majority 
of US academic research sponsors have utilitarian goals that conflict with the goal of 
producing fundamental results” (p.1) and proceeds to analyze this “goal conflict” (p.1).  
His empirical results, on projects sponsored by the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA), indicate that there is indeed a goal conflict.  This is reflected in 
a high rate of attrition among academic researchers involved in the NASA projects
3 and 
in a research output from the projects that is not highly valued in academic terms.
4  The 
                                                           
2 Instead of basicness and appliedness, I use the related terms quality and relevance, as explained below. 
3 Many researchers quit the NASA projects “for two reasons: 1) Sponsors drop researchers who do not 
produce enough sponsor-relevant output, and 2) academically successful researchers seek less restrictive, 
academically oriented funds from other programs that have a less utilitarian bent” (Goldfarb 2001:3). 




present paper differs from Goldfarb (2001) in several respects.
5  Rubinstein et al. (2003) 
analyze CRIS funding data, but without a discussion of incentives and decision making.
 6   
  Section II, the theoretical part of this paper, employs drastically simplifying 
assumptions to cut to the core themes.  The three main propositions involve differences 
among categories of sponsors in their propensity to use grants rather than contracts 
(Proposition 1) and the relationship between academic “quality” and reliance on grant 
funding versus contract funding (Propositions 2 and 3.)  Propositions 1 and 3, along with 
a number of auxiliary hypotheses, are confronted with two data sets.  The first of these 
(section III) pertains to funding received by all academic departments of the University of 
California (UC) at Berkeley.  The second data set (analyzed in section IV) is a subset of 
the Current Research Information System (CRIS) of the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA).  The two data sets – one from a set of recipients, the other from a 
set of providers of research funds – complement each other.   
  This paper may be of methodological interest.  It contains theoretical as well as 
empirical non-results.  Contrary to naïve falsificationism (see Caldwell 1991), a 
proposition with no testable implications may help us understand the real world.   
Proposition 2, a theoretical non-result, helps interpret the empirical non-results. 
Section V provides a summary, implications, and suggestions for future research. 
 
II Conceptual Issues and Theoretical Modeling 
                                                           
5 The theoretical model presented here is less rich than Goldfarb’s in that it ignores competition between 
grant applicants, but richer in that it allows for sponsors to care about fundamental results (or “quality”, as it 
is called here) as well as about utilitarian results (called “relevance” here).  Above all, in contrast to 
Goldfarb (2001), the present paper focuses on the distinction between grants and contracts.  Thus, none of 




The grants / contracts distinction is an instance of the contrast between two 
relationship types: gift and exchange.  Grants can be thought of as a type of gift, whereas 
contracts can be seen as a form of exchange, namely the purchase of “deliverables”, or 
answers to pre-specified research questions.  In practice this distinction may not be quite 
as clear-cut.  Legal concepts do provide a clear dividing line: research contracts, but not 
grants, are breached if the recipient fails to deliver the deliverables. 
Sponsors may of course care about a wide range of research outcomes.  I propose 
here to collapse these into two variables: quality and relevance.  These concepts 
correspond to basicness and appliedness, respectively.  Quality and relevance are 
performance variables: successful basic research is thought of here as having high quality; 
successful applied research is thought of as having high relevance.  The modeling of 
quality and relevance as continuous variables reflects the difficulty in drawing a clear-cut 
dividing line between basic and applied research.  Research activity, as conceived here, 
simultaneously has quality and relevance dimensions, and these are best thought of as – at 
least – two distinct and continuous variables.  It is too simple to think of research as being 
either basic or applied – a single binary variable.  However, the Berkeley data set used 
below uses precisely the latter concept: it contains a basic / applied dummy variable, 
based on subjective assessments by participants in research projects.  Over-simplified 
though it is, this is still a useful variable: the more research is oriented towards 
fundamental rather than directly utilitarian results, the more likely the research will be to 
be reported as being basic rather than applied.  This dummy is included in the empirical 
                                                                                                                                                                             
6 In addition to the sources cited here, various literature searches yielded surprisingly little in the way of 




part of this study, allowing a test of its relationship with the propensity to use grant 
funding.  
The model used is simple: Assume a single period, a single contract, a single 
grant, a single sponsor, a single research unit, scalar quality and relevance, and full 
certainty.  The sponsor’s utility U is a function of quality output Q ≥ 0 and relevance 
R ≥ 0:  ()    , UU Q R = .  Q and R are produced by the research unit; they both depend on 
the unit’s funding  F  and the relative emphasis a the unit puts on  R vis-à-vis Q, with 
a = 1 denoting full emphasis onR and a = 0 denoting full emphasis on Q.  In addition, 
they depend on the unit’s level of scholarship, S:  ()  ,, QQ a F S =  and  ()    ,, R RaFS = . 
The research unit, with utility V, is assumed not to care about relevance, only 
about quality output and about the amount of funding:  ()  , VV Q F = .  This obviously 
does not do justice to real-world universities whose research missions are partly impact-
oriented.  The main point is that sponsors tend to care more about relevance vis-à-vis 
quality than do academics because of the latter’s powerful incentives to make basic 
contributions (Goldfarb 2001).  It would be possible to include R as an argument in the 
research unit’s utility function and impose some condition that formalizes the unit’s 
greater preference for Q, but this would unnecessarily complicate the model. 
Both production functions and both utility functions are assumed to be twice 
continuously differentiable and strictly increasing in their arguments, except for Q being 
strictly decreasing in a.  The utility functions are assumed to be concave and the 
production functions strictly concave.  In addition – letting subscripts denote first and 




Funding is constrained and can be given in the form of a contract and/or a grant: 
F C G F       =+≤ .  At any optimum, F  will be exhausted.  The difference between grant 
funding and contract funding is that the latter specifies deliverables, represented by a 
minimum relevance level R > 0, whereas the former comes without any strings attached.  
Contract payment C occurs conditional on RR ≥ .  Q is assumed to be noncontractible. 
Decision-making is assumed to occur in two stages.  First the sponsor chooses G  
and the contract variables C  and R; then the research unit chooses whether to accept or 
reject the contract, and also chooses the research emphasis a. 
This modeling setup gives rise to an analytical problem: The sponsor may to a 
certain extent be indifferent between grants and contracts.  This fungibility is typical of 
hybrid gift/exchange relationships: Part of an exchange may be a subsidy that might as 
well have been transferred separately as a gift.  In order to deal with this complication, I 
assume that there is an infinitesimally small transaction cost TC ε =  associated with 
contract funding.  This assumption avoids the problem that given any optimal (from the 
sponsor’s perspective)  * CF < , any  *, CC F   ∈   will be optimal as well in combination 
with the same R .  This assumption seems reasonable because contracts entail legal and 
other costs that grants do not, while these costs tend to be relatively small.
7 
                                                           
7 Absent this assumption or any other choice rule, one would have to assume a uniform distribution over the 
set of optimal C.  This assumption ensures that the lower bound of this choice set is chosen; relaxing it 
would imply that – in expectation – its midpoint, which varies monotonically with the lower bound, is 




  I also assume that parameters are such that we have interior solutions: 
() *0 ;  *0 ;   0 ; * 0 , 1 GCR a >> > ∈  (asterisks denoting sponsor optimality).  This 
assumption avoids complications with corner solutions that do not occur in the data.
8 
Under the assumptions made, the research unit can increase V by decreasing a as 
long as the minimum-relevance constraint is slack.  Thus, the minimum-relevance 
constraint is binding, yielding a unique a*:  () *, ,   R aF S R = .  Due to the transaction-
cost assumption, it will be optimal for the sponsor to set C so that the unit’s participation 
constraint is binding as well:  
   () () () () 0, *, , *    *, , , . VQ F C S F C VQa FS F −− =      (1) 
  For a parsimonious derivation of the main results, I assume linear  () U , i.e. 
U qQ R    =+, where  0 q ≥  is a quality preference parameter.  This assumption is not as 
restrictive as might appear at first sight.  Both Q and R can be perceived of as partial 
utility indices, in which case  () Q  and  () R  are hybrid utility/production functions.  In 
this interpretation, research produces an information set to which the subjective values Q 
and R are assigned.  Thus, linear  () U  is equivalent to   () U  being linearly separable in 
() Q  and  () R .  Allowing for monotone transformations that redefine  () Q  and  () R  
such that both are still strictly monotonous and strictly concave, a fairly wide class of 
utility functions (such as Cobb-Douglas utility functions) satisfy the linearity assumption.  
The symbols () 0 o r  () *  will be used to denote evaluation of functions and their 
derivatives on the left-hand side or right-hand side, respectively, of equation (1).   
                                                           




Consider exogenous changes in q and S.  Total differentiation of first-order condition 
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Proposition 1.   Contract (grant) funding as a proportion of total funding varies 
strictly negatively (positively) with the sponsor’s quality preference: () */ / 0. dC F dq <  
Proof.  Set  0 dS =  in (2) and (3).   Q.E.D. 
Proposition 2.  Assume  QaS < 0 and  qQ R aS aS > .  Even under all the 
assumptions made so far, the overall effect of an exogenous change in the research unit’s 
level of scholarship S on grant funding  * G  or contract funding  * C  cannot be signed. 
Indication of proof.  Set  0 dq =  in (2), yielding  */ 0 da dS <  under the auxiliary 
assumptions.  However, the term  () () () () ** 00 QS QS VQ VQ −  in (3) cannot be signed.  
This can be seen as follows.  Comparing the left-hand side of equation (1) with its right-
hand side,  *0 a >  and  * F FC >− .  To ensure equality in (1), we must have 
() () *0 QQ < .  Comparing  () () ** QS VQ to  () () 00 QS VQ, the relevant second derivatives 
do not all point towards either term being greater: QaS < 0 makes the former term greater, 
while 0 FS Q > ,  0 QF V ≥  and  0 QQ V ≤  point to the latter term being greater.  Q.E.D. 
This result is interesting in part because it is counterintuitive.  The assumptions 
QaS < 0 and  qQ R aS aS >  have straightforward interpretations.  An increase in a represents 
                                                                                                                                                                             




a shifting of research inputs away from production of quality and into production of 
relevance.  A higher level of scholarship S has a positive impact on the unit’s marginal 
output of quality; this is expressed by QaS < 0.  The condition  qQ R aS aS >  reflects the 
notion that a research unit with higher S has a comparative advantage in the production of 
Q vis-à-vis R.  Note that RaS  may be positive, zero, or negative.  A negative  RaS  could be 
called the “absent-minded professor assumption”: It would imply that research units with 
higher scholarly ratings would be less capable of producing practical results.  The 
comparison between  QaS  and RaS  is weighted by the quality preference parameter q. 
Given that a higher S confers a comparative advantage in the production of Q, one 
might expect an increase in S to be unambiguously associated with a decrease in contract 
funding (which is used to induce production of R) vis-à-vis grant funding (which is the 
preferred method for funding Q-oriented research).  Why is this not the case?  Because a 
unit with higher  QaS  must be compensated more lavishly for the opportunity cost of not 
focusing entirely on Q.
9  This is especially true if  FS Q  is low, i.e. if one additional dollar 
earned by accepting the contract does not greatly improve the Q-productivity of S.  The 
latter effect may be called the “compensation effect”, as opposed to the “comparative 
advantage effect”. 
The model so far has focused on a single research unit, thus ignoring competition 
for research funds.  Inclusion of competition into the model would necessitate further 
complications to avoid winner-take-all outcomes.  In practice, competition is imperfect, 
                                                           
9 Note that a high  / aS aS QR q >  has another, opposing effect, namely to increase  */ da dS  according 





and researchers specialize in a multitude of niches.  In modeling terms, this would imply 
multiple outputs.  Such modeling challenges are beyond the scope of this paper.  Instead, 
I provide a brief informal argument leading to Proposition 3. 
Competition does not equally affect grant funding and contract funding.  Under 
competition, it is not true that grant funding and contract funding for one unit move in 
opposite directions, as was the case in the simple model above.  Maintaining the 
assumptions  QaS < 0 and  qQ R aS aS > , units with higher S will have an unambiguous 
advantage in securing grant funding, but not an unambiguous disadvantage in securing 
contract funding.  This is because the compensation effect is relevant to the distribution 
of contract funding, not to the distribution of grant funding.  Units with greater S will 
demand greater contractual compensation, but it may still be attractive for sponsors to 
offer them contracts if they have a (perceived) absolute advantage in the production of R 
(0 aS R > ).  In summary, 
Proposition 3. Under competition, grant funding for each research unit varies 
positively with S; the relationship between S and contract funding per unit cannot be 
unambiguously signed.  However, the proportion of grant funding to contract funding 
varies positively with S. 
 
III  Analysis of the Berkeley Data Set 
  The Sponsored Projects Office (SPO) of UC Berkeley supplied data for the seven-
year period 1994-2000 (fiscal years) on funding received by departments and other 
research units of the campus.  The data set contains one dollar amount per combination of 




For the purpose of hypothesis testing, each multi-year aggregate dollar figure is 
counted as one observation.  All figures are adjusted for inflation.
10  The sponsor types 
include Federal, Non-Federal Governmental, Not-For-Profit, UC, and Industry.  The 
activity types include applied research, basic research, services, training, and other.  For 
this study, the only activity types of interest are applied research and basic research.  The 
funding types include grant, contract, and cooperative agreement, but I consider 
cooperative agreements to be contracts.  The grants were all awarded competitively. 
  I used this data set for a test of Proposition 1 and auxiliary hypotheses.
11  One 
might estimate Proposition 1 with an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, using the 
ratio of grant funding over grant funding plus contract funding (or “grant funding ratio”) 
as dependent variable and NRC rating as explanatory variable.  However, OLS estimation 
in this case has two shortcomings.  First, the grant funding ratio is constrained to the 
interval  01 , , making it likely for the true relationship to level off at either end, while 
predicted OLS values could fall outside of this interval.  Second, OLS estimation would 
give equal weight to observations with vastly different dollar amounts.  For these reasons 
OLS is not the ideal way to estimate the impact of various factors on the use of grants vis-
à-vis contracts.  A weighted logistic regression appears to be more appropriate.  The 
logistic formula yields values between zero and one, approaching each extreme 
asymptotically (i.e., the “leveling off” property is satisfied).  Hence, this method 
addresses the first shortcoming.  The second shortcoming is dealt with through weighting.  
Recall that there is one dollar figure for each multi-year observation.  These dollar 
                                                           




amounts are used as weights.  This procedure predicts the probability that one dollar of 
research funding is awarded through a grant, conditioned on a number of characteristics 
of that dollar.  The weights were scaled so as to leave the number of observations – used 
by the statistical software package STATA for significance calculations – unchanged. 
The dependent variable is a dummy that takes on value 1 if the funding type is 
grant, and value 0 if it is a contract.  Funding is aggregated over the seven-year period 
1994-2000 for each combination of categories other than year.  All explanatory variables 
included in the regression are dummy variables.  The first seven dummies in Table 1 
denote broad academic areas of research.  These dummies are included to control – and 
test – for area-specific fixed effects.  When all of these dummies equal zero, the area of 
research is Humanities, which encompasses inter alia history, journalism, and languages.  
The seven other categories are Biological Sciences (“biology”), Economics and Business 
(“econ+bus”), Engineering, including medical engineering (“engineer”), Medical 
Sciences, excluding medical engineering (“medical”), Physical and Mathematical 
Sciences (“phy+math”), Social and Behavioral Sciences, excluding economics (“social”), 
and a residual category (“other”), which includes research units that cover several of these 
broad areas, or whose research mandates cannot be readily inferred from their names.   
The next four dummies, only featured in Table 1b, comprise a set of sponsor 
types; when all of these are 0, the sponsor type is Not for Profit.  These include Federal, 
Industry, Non-Federal Governmental (“nonfedgov”), and University of California 
                                                                                                                                                                             
11 In addition, I used to test Proposition 3, and obtained a significant result.  However, this test is not robust 
because it involves a comparison across academic fields at a single campus, with only one observation of S 




(“UC”).  Last comes a binary dummy (“basic”) that takes on value 1 for basic research 
and value 0 for applied research.   
Table 1 reports a simple test of the association between basic research and grant 
funding.  In Table 1a, the “basic” dummy is strongly significant; in Table 1b, this dummy 
is significant at the 10% level, but not at the 5% level.  This implies that sponsor types 
differ in their propensity to fund basic rather than applied research.  The sponsor types in 
Table 1b pick up some of the relationship between the “basic” dummy and the “grant” 
dummy.  These results indicate a fairly strong to strong relationship between the use of 
grants (as opposed to contracts) and the funding of basic (as opposed to applied) research. 
Next, consider Proposition 1.  How to test the hypothesis that sponsor types with a 
stronger preference for quality over relevance will furnish a greater proportion of their 
funding in the form of grants?  The problem here is that the quality preference parameter 
q cannot be measured.  I suggest the following solution to this problem.  We can make 
reasonable a priori conjectures about differences in q among sponsor types.  We can 
expect q to correspond to the extent a sponsor type is likely to care about the public-good 
nature of research results.  Thus, among the sponsor types included here, Federal agencies 
– which service by far the largest group of constituents, namely the citizens of the United 
States, and which are more likely to care about the science and technology aspects of the 
country’s super power status  – can be expected to have the highest q.  Industry, on the 
other hand, which is driven by short- to medium-term profit considerations, and which 
will highly value specific research results, can be expected to have the lowest q.  The 




objectives, but can on average be expected to have a q somewhere between these two 
extremes.  The way these dummies are defined, the latter is the default category. 
It may be objected here that even federal government agencies may have strong 
utilitarian motivations.  This is stressed by Goldfarb (2001), who notes that most federal 
research sponsors are mission-oriented and interested in specific research outcomes.   
Goldfarb raises concerns about the goal conflict between federal sponsors and academic 
researchers who face professional incentives to produce research results of a more 
fundamental nature.  The empirical part of his study focuses on funding of academic 
research by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). 
Federal agencies sponsoring research are in fact likely to differ widely in this 
respect.  The National Science Foundation (NSF), Department of Energy (DOE) and 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) may well have a higher q than most other major 
federal research sponsors, such as NASA and the Departments of Defense, Commerce, 
and Agriculture (David Mowery, pers. com., and Goldfarb 2001, fn. 1).  Unfortunately, 
the Berkeley data set does not differentiate between federal sources.  However, it should 
be kept in mind that federal sponsors are compared here with other categories, and it is 
still likely that, on average, they have higher q than these other categories.  For example, 
agencies like the NSF, DOE and NIH are probably more important at the federal level 
than at the state level.  Moreover, even the federal agencies that may have a lower q than 
these three agencies are still likely to have a higher q than their counterparts at the state 
level.  Research sponsored by the U.S. Department of Agriculture is more likely to have 
nation-wide significance for agriculture than otherwise similar research sponsored at the 




prestige.  As to industry-sponsored research, here the pressure for directly utilitarian 
results is still likely to be the greatest, due to pressures from shareholders and other 
financiers to maximize the rate of return of the sponsors’ investments. 
Thus, Proposition 1 can be translated into two hypotheses: That the Federal 
dummy is positively, and the Industry dummy negatively, related to the Grants dummy.  
Both hypotheses are overwhelmingly confirmed in Table 1b.
12  (See the z and P>|z| 
columns between the basic and other rows.)  Interestingly, the Non-Federal 
Governmental dummy comes close to the Industry dummy in having a very low odds 
ratio and a strongly negative relationship with the Grants dummy.  This indicates that 
agencies belonging to the State of California (in all likelihood the main component of this 
category) tend to have a strong preference – relative to Federal and non-governmental 
nonprofit Federal sponsors – for contracts, i.e. for specific research results.  The 
University of California dummy displays a strong positive relationship with the Grants 
dummy.  This result supports the assumption used in the theoretical part of this paper that 
academic policymakers are characterized by a strong emphasis on scholarly quality and 
prestige as opposed to practical or immediate relevance. 
Finally, I estimated the relative propensity to use grants for broad academic 
categories (Table 1b).  Compared to the default category of Humanities, all other 
categories have a greater propensity to use contract funding (as can be seen by the string 
of negative values in the z column below the basic row), but only Physical and 
Mathematical Sciences and Engineering significantly so at any of the commonly used 




surprise; given the applied nature of engineering, research projects in this category are 
more likely than those in other categories to have narrowly focused objectives, which are 
amenable to inclusion in a contract as deliverables. 
 
IV Analysis of the CRIS Data Set 
  CRIS contains a wealth of data on agricultural research funded by the USDA and 
affiliated government agencies.  Many of the research units identified in CRIS are not 
university departments.  Data from those that are university departments are often 
difficult to match with rating data.  For example, names of academic departments at 
various universities include Biochemistry and Microbiology; Anatomy, Physiology, and 
Cell Biology; Cellular and Molecular Biology; Molecular, Cellular and Developmental 
Biology; and several dozens more such variations.  These are not easily compatible with 
the National Research Council ratings (Goldberger et al. 1995) which cover areas such as 
Biochemistry and Molecular Biology; Cellular and Developmental Biology; Molecular 
Biology and Genetics; and Physiology.  To avoid such problems, I selected a field for 
which CRIS data and rating data are more readily compatible: agricultural economics.  
There is a readily identifiable set of U.S. agricultural economics departments.
13    While 
the NRC does not provide a ranking of agricultural economics departments, there are 
rankings available that use a similar methodology.  Perry conducted two surveys of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
12 The hypothesis that industry is, more than other sponsors of academic research, inclined to use contracts 
rather than grants, is confirmed by Geiger’s (1992:277) observations. 
13 This set consists of all departments with “economics” or “agribusiness” in their names (except for “home 
economics”) at land grant universities which received at least some funding other than formula funding in 
the period 1992-2001 according to the CRIS data set. (The only departments thus identified that are called 
“Economics” are at South Dakota State University and Iowa State University.)  In each case I checked 




agricultural economists, one in 1993 (Perry 1994), the other in 1999 (Perry 1999), asking 
them to rank the top 20 Ph.D. programs and top 10 M.S. programs in agricultural 
economics, using a scale from 1 to 5.  Perry then computed the average ratings of the 
programs and used them for separate rankings for Ph.D. and M.S. programs.  Programs 
that were not listed by sufficiently many respondents were excluded from these rankings.  
The rankings do not take into account the number of responses.  For example, in 1999, 
Oklahoma State University is ranked 20
th, based on an average rating of 2.84, and 
Washington State University is ranked 21
st with an average rating of 2.81 (Perry 1999, 
Table 1).  However, 34 respondents listed Washington State, while only 25 respondents 
listed Oklahoma State.  It seems reasonable to let the 9 additional respondents of 
Washington State carry more weight than the 0.03 higher average rating of Oklahoma 
State.  Thus, my preferred method would be to multiply a department’s average rating by 
the number of respondents listing it, which yields the total score.  Perry recognizes this 
alternative ranking method (1994, fn.4), but does not use it in his tables.  Perry (1999, 
Table 6) finds an extremely high correlation of 0.977 between his 1999 and 1993 ratings.  
The correlation between the alternative ratings, based on total score, for both years, is 
extremely high as well: 0.962. 
The CRIS data used here span a ten-year period from fiscal year 1992 through 
fiscal year 2001.  I deflated the data so that all were in 1992 dollars.
14  I then aggregated 
the data twice: over projects per funding type per department, and over the ten-year 
period.  To match these data with the agricultural economics rating data, I took the 
average of each department’s ratings, based on total score, from 1993 and 1999, and used 
                                                           




the resulting numbers as explanatory variable in my regression.  The extremely high 
autocorrelation between the 1993 and 1999 scores warrants this step. 
I also compared rated with non-rated agricultural economics departments.  Of the 
departments included in Perry’s 1999 Ph.D. ranking, only one was not included in his 
1993 ranking, namely Kansas State.  Perry excluded Kansas State in 1993 because it was 
listed by only 22 out of 62 respondents.  However, these gave Kansas State an average 
rating of 3.00 in 1993, which does not compare unfavorably with Georgia State, which 
was listed by 26 respondents but only rated 2.81 by them on average (Perry 1994, fn.5 
and Table 1).
15  Two agricultural economics departments appear on Perry’s 1999 M.S. 
ranking that do not have Ph.D. programs: Montana State and Arizona State.  I considered 
these to be “ranked” for the purpose of my dummy-based regression, even though they do 
not have a Ph.D. rating.  It makes sense to classify these two departments in this way 
because they are ranked high on the M.S. list: numbers 4 and 5 respectively out of 16 
ranked programs (Perry 1999, Table 2).  In other words, they leave most departments that 
have Ph.D. programs behind them on this list. 
I conducted regressions for four types of funding: Cooperative Agreements and 
Other Contracts (in short, Contract Funding); NRI Competitive Grants; Special Grants; 
and Other Grants.
16  Cooperative agreements are really a type of contracts.  NRI 
Competitive Grants differ from Special Grants in that the latter are not awarded 
                                                           
15 On the other hand, there was a large gap between the Ph.D. programs ranked in Perry (1999) plus Kansas 
State and the other Ph.D. programs in terms of number of respondents listing the department. 
16 I lumped together the CRIS categories “USDA Cooperative Agreement,” “Cooperative Agreement,” and 
“USDA Contract” under “Cooperative Agreements and Contracts.”  I included the CRIS category 
“CSREES Grant Program” under “Other Grants.”  I did not consider various types of so-called formula 
funds, funds allocated by formula to states, universities, and agricultural experiment stations.  These are not 




competitively.  Instead, the latter are a subset of “earmark grants,” awarded through 
political processes in Congress, with Congress members acting on behalf of their home 
constituencies (pers. com. Allen Moore; de Figueiredo and Silverman 2002:2).  In other 
words, Special Grants are a form of so-called “pork barrel” spending.  Other Grants are 
awarded competitively, but they tend to cover more applied topics then do NRI 
Competitive Grants.  They are often more focused on particular commodities than are 
NRI Competitive Grants.  A typical example of the category “Other Grants” is a grant to 
the National Center for Peanut Competitiveness at the University of Georgia’s 
Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics.  Among the project’s objectives are 
the following: “To determine the economic efficiency of current and potential peanut 
production practices and to assess these alternatives in improving the overall 
competitiveness of US peanut production.”
17   
  Using the CRIS data set in combination with Perry’s (1994, 1999) ratings, I 
conducted a series of regressions, for which I used a different method than for the ones in 
section III, reflecting differences in the data.  In contrast to the Berkeley data set, CRIS 
contains data for multiple research institutions per discipline, but only accounts for a 
fraction of the funding received by each institution.  Thus CRIS cannot be used to 
construct grant funding ratios per institution.  On the other hand, CRIS lends itself for 
cross-institutional comparisons for each specific type of funding. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
by formula as well), and part of them may be allocated as competitive grants by agricultural experiment 
stations to academic departments, but the CRIS data set does not provide this information. 
17 According to project description on CRIS website (Accession Number 0190721), downloaded September 





  My subset of the CRIS data set only lists the departments that received funding of 
at least one of the types included.  This selection criterion appears to yield a complete list 
of agricultural economics departments in the U.S.  For any funding type there was a 
significant number of departments that did not receive funding in that category.  Because 
of the large number of observations with zero values for the dependent variable in all of 
these regressions, I used Tobit regressions that are left-censored at zero.  Again, STATA 
was used.  I used exclusively funding of the various types as dependent variables, and 
rating-related variables as explanatory variables.  The latter was either rating itself or a 
rated/non-rated dummy.  I thus conducted eight regressions (Table 2), one for each 
combination of funding type and rating or rated/non-rated dummy.  The results of these 
are striking, in spite of the small sample size.  The two regressions for NRI Grant 
Funding yield clearly significant results.  Departments that are ranked by Perry (1994, 
1999) have a very strongly significant edge over those that are not in securing NRI 
funding (Table 2c).  Furthermore, among the ranked departments, the higher-ranked ones 
are significantly more successful in obtaining NRI funding than the lower ranked ones at 
the 2% level (Table 2d).  All of the other agricultural economics regressions yield very 
clearly insignificant results.  The two other categories of grants in the CRIS database, 
Special Grants and Other Grants, are not awarded preferentially to departments that are 
ranked or ranked more highly (Tables 2e, f, g and h).  This can be explained as follows.  
Special Grants are dependent on political processes and are presumably awarded to 
departments that have better Congressional connections, which are not necessarily the 
ones that are more highly ranked.  “Earmark grants” (of which the Special Grants of this 




Silverman (2002) show empirically that investments in Congressional lobbying for 
earmark grants pay off for academic departments.  Other Grants, in contrast, are awarded 
competitively, but as pointed out tend to fund projects that are more applied in nature 
than the ones funded by NRI grants.  Contract Funding is very clearly not significantly 
related to academic rating (Tables 2a and 2b).  While the number of observations reported 
in these regressions is low, these data were obtained by several aggregations over far 
larger amounts of observations.  Furthermore, the insignificance results are all far from 
any conventional level of significance, while the significant results are strong. 
Overall, then, the agricultural economics regressions are consistent with 
Proposition 3.  Since the only regressions that yield significant results are those relating 
grant funding (albeit of one type, namely NRI grants) to academic rating, while those for 
contract funding are all clearly insignificant, it can be concluded that departments that are 
more highly rated tend to rely to a greater extent on grant funding relative to contract 
funding than do those that are less highly rated.  However, there are nuances to this 
overall pattern: There are certain types of grants that do not conform to the theoretical 
analysis of section 1 because they are allocated through political processes or because 
they tend to be used for relatively applied research. 
In light of Proposition 2, the insignificance results for the contract funding may be 
interpreted as follows.  Higher ranked departments require more funding per unit of 
principal investigators’ time to compensate them due to their greater opportunity cost.  
However, as evinced by the insignificance results, they are generally not outcompeted in 
the contract funding market.  This may be due to their having an absolute advantage in 




of quality.  Note that this interpretation would not imply that researchers at higher ranked 
departments are necessarily “better” at contractual research than the ones at lower ranked 
departments.  The former may have a productivity advantage because of the more 
prestigious institutions’ more abundant resources, other than grant or contract funding. 
To be sure, there are alternative or complementary explanations for the higher- 
ranked departments’ equal level of activity in contractual, applied research (Binenbaum 
2002).  For example, there may be synergies in the production of basic and applied 
research results.  To a certain extent, fundamental contributions may be enhanced by 
keeping in touch with the real world.  But if quality and relevance outputs are 
complements, they are imperfect ones, and a tradeoff between the two is the typical 
pattern. 
 
V  Concluding Comments 
This paper develops and tests two main results.  Proposition 1 predicts that 
sponsors with a stronger preference for high academic quality over immediate relevance 
are more likely to give funding in the form of grants.  Sponsors’ preferences cannot be 
measured; however, Proposition 1 is testable if we allow ourselves to make some 
reasonable assumptions about differences in preferences between different sponsor types.  
The second result, Proposition 3, predicts that academic research units with a higher 
scholarly reputation are likely to receive a greater proportion of their funding in the form 
of grants.  Auxiliary hypotheses being tested here concern the relationship between the 
use of grants (rather than contracts) and research being basic (rather than applied), and 




addition to the testable results, there is Proposition 2, which decomposes the effect of 
scholarly quality on contract funding into opposing effects. 
Analysis of the Berkeley data yields significant results for Proposition 1 and the 
auxiliary hypotheses.  The CRIS data permit tests of Proposition 3 which involve separate 
regressions for grant funding and contract funding.  The only significant results here show 
a positive relationship between grant funding and academic quality (insofar as the latter is 
properly measured by reputational surveys among peers in the same discipline).  Contract 
funding is uniformly not significantly related to academic reputation.  
The theoretical and empirical results of this paper have two major implications. 
First, they confirm the existence of a division of labor in academia where elite 
departments tend to focus more on fundamental research than other departments.   
However, higher- and lower-ranked departments appear to be equally involved in more 
applied research. It may be attractive for researchers at more prestigious universities to 
remain involved in applied research because of possible synergies with more fundamental 
research.  Second, they point towards the bivariate nature of research outputs.  It makes 
more sense to view applied and basic research results as two different kinds of research 
outputs rather than opposite segments of a single dimension.  If these two types of outputs 
are complements, they are imperfect ones, and important tradeoffs between them will 
often occur.  Reputational surveys such as those of the NRC and of Perry tend to measure 
fundamental contributions rather than applied contributions.  If one wanted to measure 
the “relevance” or directly utilitarian contribution of research, one would have to conduct 
surveys of the users of such research – government policymakers, managers in firms, 




one-sided assessment involving only one type of research output, ignore the other major 
type of research output – possibly to the detriment of less prestigious departments. 
Let me conclude with suggestions for future research.  First, causal relationships 
between academic performance variables, such as rating, publications, or citations, and 
funding variables may well run both ways.  Data sets such as those used here might be 
exploited more fully using time series analysis, perhaps enabling estimation of such bi-
directional relationships.
18   
  Second, repeated interactions may be a fertile ground for extending the model, 
which considers only a one-shot game.  In the real world, sponsors and performers of 
academic research interact repeatedly over many years.  This blurs to some extent the 
distinction between grants and contracts.  Sponsors may use future withholding or 
renewal of funding as incentive mechanisms to induce production of deliverables by grant 
recipients.  Furthermore, grant recipients’ performance may affect their reputation and 
hence their competitive edge.  However, the same considerations pertain to contracts.  
Enforcement in repeated games is typically imperfect; hence, the additional enforcement 
mechanism provided by contracts – sanctions for breach of contract – remains relevant. 
  Third, contracts may be preferred to grants for reasons other than to enforce 
production of deliverables.  Parties may contribute other items such as materials, 
information, intellectual property, or human resources, and they may wish to commit each 
other to certain behaviors or policies like confidentiality.  Contracts may thus be used for 
relationships that are more complex than simple research funding. 
                                                           
18 Koshal et al. (1996) recognize the bidirectional nature of this relationship and address it through a 
simultaneous-equations empirical model, but clearly time series analysis would be a superior mode of 




Fourth, allowing for multiple sponsors leads to complications of strategic 
interdependence, in particular to prisoner’s dilemmas: Sponsors with similar objectives 
may free-ride on each other’s funding of research units.  One could perhaps avoid this 
sort of complications through a model where one type of sponsor cares only about 
relevance, and the other only about quality.   
Fifth, one could extend the model by considering costly information, uncertainty, 
observability, or costs associated with breach of contract.  One of the main rationales for 
competition for grants is its role of generating information for sponsors.  As to 
uncertainty, one of the most brazenly cavalier assumptions made here is that of complete 
certainty.  In reality, of course, research is, by its very nature, a highly uncertain process.  
As to observability of research output, there is no doubt that this is an important issue too.  
Research contracts specify deliverables and may also specify damages that apply if the 
deliverables are not produced in timely fashion.  However, I do not know of a single 
example of this actually happening at any academic department.  Contractual obligations 
are, or at least appear to be, invariably met.  Why? is an interesting question.  Perhaps 
reputation concerns play an important role here.  Deliverables for contracts may be 
selected for having a high degree of certainty. 
Sixth, a fuller understanding of the division of labor in academic research would 
require consideration of all the different outputs of universities and the allocation of 
resources between them.
19  Perhaps six main categories of university outputs can be 
identified here: fundamental and utilitarian research contributions, graduate and 




Finally, a related set of issues pertains to departments’ and researchers’ 
motivations.  Do researchers in less prestigious units aspire to making fundamental 
contributions without being to do so to the extent they would like?  Or do researchers 
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Table 1a: Excluding Sponsor Types 
 
Logit estimates                                   Number of obs   =        846 
                                                  LR chi2(8)      =     205.73 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -439.51121                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1897 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   grant | Odds Ratio   Std. Err.       z     P>|z|       [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 biology |   .3763413    .450977     -0.816   0.415       .0359394    3.940877 
econ+bus |   .1949227   .2559106     -1.245   0.213       .0148708    2.554994 
engineer |   .0486249   .0576404     -2.551   0.011       .0047625    .4964553 
 medical |   .5191397   .6313408     -0.539   0.590       .0478755    5.629307 
   other |   .1375704   .1735719     -1.572   0.116        .011603    1.631104 
phy+math |   .1481606   .1761028     -1.606   0.108       .0144212    1.522178 
  social |   .3238656   .4000634     -0.913   0.361       .0287671    3.646143 





Table 1b: Including Sponsor Types 
 
Logit estimates                                   Number of obs   =        846 
                                                  LR chi2(12)     =     424.59 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -330.08309                       Pseudo R2       =     0.3914 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   grant | Odds Ratio   Std. Err.       z     P>|z|       [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 biology |   .3902568   .5284148     -0.695   0.487       .0274668     5.54489 
econ+bus |   .1442988   .2160299     -1.293   0.196       .0076723    2.713925 
engineer |   .0247057   .0328275     -2.785   0.005       .0018271    .3340616 
 medical |   .2084179   .2843624     -1.149   0.250       .0143737    3.022052 
   other |   .2307072   .3467671     -0.976   0.329       .0121242     4.39005 
phy+math |   .0538298   .0715563     -2.198   0.028       .0039766    .7286699 
  social |   .2909015   .4045306     -0.888   0.375       .0190571    4.440537 
 federal |   4.030238   1.076488      5.218   0.000       2.387659    6.802821 
industry |   .0082406   .0097484     -4.056   0.000        .000811    .0837356 
nonfedgov|   .0291361   .0226413     -4.550   0.000       .0063529    .1336253 
      UC |   6.227311   3.806123      2.992   0.003       1.879523    20.63258 
   basic |   1.657266   .4430105      1.890   0.059       .9814184    2.798533 
______________________________________________________________________________  
 




Table 2. Tobit Regressions of Agricultural Economics Funding 
 
Dependent variable is funding of several types (Cooperative agreements, NRI grants, 
Special grants, and Other grants) from 1992 through 2001 in constant 1992 dollars. 
Explanatory variable is either a rated/non-rated dummy or rating. 
 





a. Cooperative agreements funding on Rated/non-rated dummy 
              
                  Number of obs   =         56 
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       0.01 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.9252 
Log likelihood = -342.58035                        
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         |      Coef.   Std. Err.       t     P>|t|       [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   dummy |   5155.743   54958.37      0.094   0.926      -104983.3    115294.8 
   _cons |  -52708.16   41205.78     -1.279   0.206      -135286.4    29870.07 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Obs. summary:        32 left-censored observations at Coop. agr. funding = 0 






b. Cooperative agreements funding on Rating 
 
                    Number of obs   =         22 
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       0.42 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.5193 
Log likelihood = -148.65261                        
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         |      Coef.   Std. Err.       t     P>|t|       [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  rating |    197.004   307.8771      0.640   0.529      -443.2614    837.2694 
   _cons |  -36716.51   61265.45     -0.599   0.555        -164125    90691.98 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Obs. summary:        11 left-censored observations at Coop. agr. funding = 0 











c. NRI grants funding on Rated/non-rated dummy  
 
                                      Number of obs   =         56 
                                            LR chi2(1)      =      16.54 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -675.00893                        
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         |      Coef.   Std. Err.       t     P>|t|       [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   dummy |   418920.3   96518.45      4.340   0.000         225493    612347.6 
   _cons |   157906.8   64680.99      2.441   0.018       28283.15    287530.4 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Obs. summary:         9 left-censored observations at NRI grants funding = 0 





d. NRI grants funding on Rating  
 
                                            Number of obs   =         22 
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       5.71 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0169 
Log likelihood =  -299.9788                        
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         |      Coef.   Std. Err.       t     P>|t|       [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  rating |   2814.657   1113.142      2.529   0.020       499.7505    5129.563 
   _cons |   107217.5   211106.8      0.508   0.617        -331803    546238.1 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Obs. summary:         1 left-censored observation at NRI grants funding = 0 









e. Special grants funding on Rated/non-rated dummy  
 
                                            Number of obs   =         56 
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       0.08 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.7743 
Log likelihood = -412.72595                        
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         |      Coef.   Std. Err.       t     P>|t|       [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   dummy |   80767.15   281245.6      0.287   0.775      -482861.6    644395.9 
   _cons |  -195336.4     199496     -0.979   0.332      -595135.4    204462.6 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Obs. summary:        30 left-censored observations at Special grants funding = 0 





f. Special grants funding on Rating 
 
                                      Number of obs   =         22 
                                            LR chi2(1)      =       0.83 
                                            Prob > chi2     =     0.3609 
Log likelihood = -174.88284                        
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         |      Coef.   Std. Err.       t     P>|t|       [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  rating |   3154.934   3424.735      0.921   0.367      -3967.194    10277.06 
   _cons |  -644563.1   674106.1     -0.956   0.350       -2046444    757317.4 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Obs. summary:        11 left-censored observations at Special grants funding = 0 










g. Other grants funding on Rated/non-rated dummy  
 
                   Number of obs   =         56 
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       0.38 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.5365 
Log likelihood =  -295.5208                        
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         |      Coef.   Std. Err.       t     P>|t|       [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   dummy |  -231514.7   371766.8     -0.623   0.536      -976551.9    513522.6 
   _cons |  -443123.5   293417.5     -1.510   0.137       -1031145    144898.3 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Obs. summary:        38 left-censored observations at Other grants funding = 0 





h. Other grants funding on Rating 
 
 
                                      Number of obs   =         22 
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       0.40 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.5286 
Log likelihood = -123.71015                        
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         |      Coef.   Std. Err.       t     P>|t|       [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  rating |   1065.805   1733.346      0.615   0.545      -2538.886    4670.495 
   _cons |  -342080.8   369137.4     -0.927   0.365       -1109744    425582.3 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Obs. summary:        14 left-censored observations at Other grants funding = 0 
                      8 uncensored observations 
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